How Russians voted in the State Duma election. Part 2
More than half of the Russians who told ExtremeScan on 20 September that they had voted — 53% — did not name the party they voted for. That is far more than in other electoral surveys, including VCIOM's 2026 exit poll. Why the party results of an election-day survey cannot be read as an estimate of the election outcome, what the last pre-election survey shows, and what lesson the monitoring of the 2013 Moscow mayoral election offers.
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How Russians voted in the State Duma election
An ExtremeScan telephone survey on the last voting day, 20 September 2026: 1640 respondents, 980 of whom had already voted. Who voted, on which day and by what means; which party people say they voted for and how many refuse to say; whether voters expect an honest count. The main result is two electorates divided by the calendar: Friday belonged to the state sector, online voting and United Russia, Sunday to polling-station voters, the private sector and the protest vote.
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Party preferences of Russians ahead of the State Duma election
Interim results of an ExtremeScan telephone survey conducted on 4–10 September 2026, a week before the State Duma election. 800 of a planned 1,600 respondents have been interviewed. The report covers party standings, expectations of the election and assessments of the outgoing Duma, together with a modelled share for Yabloko, the party barred from the ballot: 18.0% of adult Russians would vote for it — 24.6% of those who have made up their minds.
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To stop the war. To change Russia.
On TV Rain, Mikhail Khodorkovsky questioned whether Russian society—including young people and Moscow residents—can become an agent of change after Putin. Data from 35 waves of research conducted by ExtremeScan and Chronicles paint a different picture: young people remain the most anti-war group (23% support the “special military operation,” while 47% do not), and the notion of a “pro-war Moscow” is not supported by the data. But this is not only about the numbers. Ending the war requires a majority willing to accept compromises; democratic transformation requires an active minority capable of taking action. Where, then, should we look for this human potential for change?
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Russia’s wartime parties: how Russians plan to vote – and why
Several months before the State Duma elections, two-thirds of Russians have already named the party they are willing to vote for. But ratings tell us only the size of each electorate. ExtremeScan’s July survey shows what really distinguishes these groups: not ideology or the familiar left–right political spectrum, but attitudes toward the war and willingness to pay for its continuation. The choice between a new mobilization and a peace agreement separates party electorates far more sharply than abstract support for the “special military operation” – and reveals the limit of the price even the most loyal groups are willing to bear.
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“It’s time to put an end to this”. A study of how Russians perceive the meaning of the war and Russian and Ukrainian attitudes toward a ceasefire
This release is based on the study “Meanings of the War,” conducted by ExtremeScan in March 2026 in Russia and Ukraine in collaboration with the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
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Worse than drones: Russians react acutely to blocking and shutdowns, and resentment is growing
In this article, Marat Svetlov and Elena Koneva examine how public tensions caused by internet shutdowns and the blocking of messaging apps in Russia — along with reactions to drone attacks and economic sanctions — are gradually eroding support for the government.
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From Peacemaker to Clown: Trump in Ukrainian and Russian public opinion and in Kremlin discourse
During the election campaign, Donald Trump sparked a surge of hope in both Russia and Ukraine for a swift end to the conflict. His initial steps in this direction, however, produced a paradoxical outcome: in both countries public sentiment hardened in favour of more militant positions, and a persistent pattern of distrust towards Trump himself took hold. To Russian observers his initiatives appear unstable and unreliable, while to Ukrainians they seem aggressively imposed.
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Insurmountable Public Obstacles to Peace Agreement Between Warring Nations: None Exist
ExtremeScan's February-March 2025 survey analyzing the state of social perception of war and its end in belligerent countries
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Trump rallied Ukraine
The aftermath of Zelensky and Trump meeting at the White House in ExtremeScan survey
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Russians’ Expectations of Imminent Victory on Kremlin Terms Soar
Sociologist Elena Koneva examines the impact of the “Trump factor” on Russian public opinion.
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The Ratings Game of Vladimir Putin
An analysis of Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings reveals a complex picture of public sentiment in Russia.
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The Political Legacy of Alexei Navalny
The question of the fate of Alexei Navalny's political capital is becoming especially acute today.
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Public Perception of the War: Shifting from Repression to Awareness
Analysis of the perception of war shows that it is increasingly difficult for people to ignore it, as life forces them to realise it
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The Crocus City terrorist attack: concluding the election and continuing the special military operation
We publish a release on the impact of the terrorist attack in Crocus City on support for the war and assessment of Putin's performance
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Phases of Perception of the War in Ukraine by Russian Population
Elena Koneva's presentation at the King's College Symposium, London, April 2024
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#7. Study of Russian residents' electoral actions on 15-17 March 2024
The seventh wave of ExtremeScan electoral monitoring
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#6. The ultimate week of the electoral campaign for Russia's 15-17 March presidential election. Noon versus dusk.
The sixth wave of electoral monitoring before the March 15-17 presidential elections in the Russian Federation
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#5. The penultimate week of the electoral campaign for the 15-17 March presidential election in Russia. Are there any more surprises?
Electoral monitoring at the beginning of March 2024 conducted by ExtremeScan research group by telephone survey method
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# 3-4. Analyzing electoral preferences. What comes next?
Electoral preferences of Russian residents in the Russian presidential election in March 2024
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Who is bidding farewell to Alexei Navalny
Today, grief over Alexei's death is a sign of that part of society that makes up "the other Russia."
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#2 Study of the Electoral Intentions of the Population of Russia During the Presidential Elections in March 2024.
Analysis of the second telephone survey between February 1 and February 7, 2024
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#1 Study of the Electoral Intentions of the Population of Russia During the Presidential Elections in March 2024
In January 2024 the study of the Electoral Consciousness of the Population of Russia (Presidential Elections in March 2024) took place
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SECOND DEMOBILISATION: HOW PUBLIC OPINION CHANGED DURING THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR
Published in Re:Russia, January 24, 2024
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Ukrainian society. Twenty months of the full-scale war
Elena Koneva's presentation at the annual conference of the Japanese Association of Public Opinion Researchers, November 2023
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Crimea May Be Russia, But Ukraine Definitely Is Not
Based on data from a new survey, sociologist Leonid Kesman writes about how Russians’ understanding of their country’s borders has changed and what influences their views on whether a particular territory belongs to Russia.
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Russia's Shifting Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine
"Party of War" vs. "Party of Peace": experts on whether it is possible to change the attitude of the majority of Russians to war
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BETWEEN MOBILISATION AND TOLERANCE
Is it possible today to talk about pragmatic cooperation between Ukrainians and Russians for the sake of ending the war (on Ukrainian terms)
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The future becomes an increasingly frightening anticipation of punishment
Sociologist Elena Koneva on how explosions and diversions inside Russia will change society's attitude toward the war.
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Victory is to get back in time where the war hadn’t started yet
What connection do Russians see between the two wars? And how do they perceive victory today?
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#18. Chronicles of the resistance: what we know about war opponents in Russia
At least 30 million Russians oppose the war. Why can’t they ‘overthrow the regime’? Sociologist Elena Koneva explains
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#17. The War is getting closer
On March 27-31, 2023, ExtremeScan conducted a survey of attitudes toward war in three border regions: Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk
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#16. The Swamps of War
Continued analysis of Russian society after one year of war. Consequences and phases of the war.
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THE PLUNGE INTO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION CHRONICLED
Analysis of the state of public consciousness in Russia throughout the year of the war. Entering the fifth phase - immersion in war and non-resistance to it.
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#15. Call of Duty: Research in Warzone
Speech by Elena Koneva at the 75th Annual Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR)
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#14. The first phase of a special military operation in the minds of Russians
Consolidated analysis of the perception of "special military operation" in the minds of Russians for the first six months of the war
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#13. Ordeal by mobilization
Mobilization as a new shock to Russian society during the war. Who and how perceives the new reality of life in Russia?
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#12. Who won't come to Europe?
Who are the Russians who will be affected by the visa ban in reality? What consequences await the Russians and Europeans after that ban?
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Support for the war among those surveyed in Russia has dropped to 55%
A new chapter in the perception of the military operation. REPUBLIC, Dmitriy Kolezev
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#11. Moldova and Transnistria in the context of Russia's war with Ukraine. May-June 2022
Are the residents of Moldova and Transnistria ready to fight in the event of military action spilling over from the territory of Ukraine?
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The All-Soviet Union Center of Public Opinion Study (VCIOM)
A large, high-quality investigation by The Project. Why Russian sociological data raise reasonable doubts
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#10. Ukraine and Moldova's European integration. Year 2022
The most recent data of public opinion of Ukrainian and Moldovan residents about European integration
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#9 'Mobilize me' or 'Mom, take me home'?
In this post-release we made analysis of the influence of various factors on the willingness of personal participation in combat operations
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#8. Impact of social environment on Russian attitude toward the military actions in Ukraine
Segmentation of the population in relation to military operations. Influence of the environment on opinions about the military operation.
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#7. Mirror of the “military operation”
Sociologists from the two countries at war continue to do their work despite the censorship in Russia and the horrors of war in Ukraine
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#6. Respondents' cooperation in surveys on military operations
We continue to explore the feasibility and correctness of wartime researches
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#5. Anatomy of Support
Analysis of attitudes of Russian residents to the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine
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#4. What the ratings won't tell you
What lies behind the high support ratings and what points should not be overlooked when analyzing polling data
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#2. What can be measured under military censorship
What actually needs to be analyzed under military censorship: words or silence?
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#1. The Athena Project
Russian citizens on the 'special military operation' in Ukraine - independent opinion poll