Party preferences of Russians ahead of the State Duma election

The State Duma election will be held on 18–20 September 2026. ExtremeScan conducted a telephone survey of Russian residents on 4–10 September. What follows are interim results on a sample of 800 respondents out of a planned 1,600; the full report will be published after the election.

97.3% of respondents know of the coming election or have heard something about it.

The data are published without comparison to the results of other research organisations.

Party standings

67% of respondents named a party they are ready to vote for (n=544). A further 19.3% found it hard to answer or refused, 8.1% will not vote, 4.7% will spoil their ballot, and 0.9% will vote “anyone but United Russia”.

Party preferences: all voters

Percentages are weighted.

	% of respondents
United Russia	23.9%
Communist Party (KPRF)	16.0%
New People	10.8%
LDPR	7.3%
A Just Russia	4.0%
Party of Pensioners	1.9%
The Greens	1.4%
Rodina	0.9%
Communists of Russia	0.5%
Party of Direct Democracy	0.3%
Anyone but United Russia	0.9%
Would spoil the ballot	4.7%
Would not vote	8.1%
Hard to say / refused	19.3%

Four of the ten parties have fewer than eleven respondents each, and the Party of Direct Democracy has one: their shares are given for completeness of the distribution and carry no standalone meaning.

Party standings among decided voters

Respondents who named no party — 33% of the sample — are excluded.

	% of decided
United Russia	35.6%
Communist Party (KPRF)	23.9%
New People	16.2%
LDPR	11.0%
A Just Russia	5.9%
Party of Pensioners	2.8%
The Greens	2.2%
Rodina	1.3%
Communists of Russia	0.7%
Party of Direct Democracy	0.4%

Five parties clear the 5% threshold on these data.

Vote shares of parties clearing the 5% threshold

The previous table renormalised over the five parties above the threshold. These are party-list vote shares, not Duma seats: the single-mandate half of the chamber is not modelled here.

	% of votes
United Russia	38.5%
Communist Party (KPRF)	25.8%
New People	17.5%
LDPR	11.8%
A Just Russia	6.4%

These are party-list vote shares. Half the seats in the State Duma are filled in single-mandate districts, and that half is not modelled here.

Yabloko

Yabloko has been barred from the election and is absent from the ballot. To estimate its possible share, respondents were asked a separate question. Answer options were not read out.

Conditional vote for Yabloko

Q17: “If the party Yabloko were on the ballot, would you vote for it or not?”

Answer options were not read out.

	% of respondents
Would probably vote for it	18.0%
Would probably not	64.8%
Do not know the party	6.5%
Hard to say	9.6%
Refused	1.1%

18.0% answered yes — 141 respondents.

In ExtremeScan’s July survey Yabloko was still on the list of parties read out, taking 4% of all voters and 6% of decided voters. The report published on those data, Russia’s wartime parties, stated: “if a party advocating an end to the war had remained on the ballot, it would have been entirely realistic for it to receive at least 18-20%”.

The rise in Yabloko’s potential support cannot, however, be set directly against the party’s July rating. In July respondents picked Yabloko from the general list of parties, whereas in September they were asked separately whether they might vote for Yabloko if it were running. Presenting the question that way can in itself inflate the measured electoral potential.

But the methodological effect is not the only explanation. Over the intervening months Yabloko ran a full election campaign, which in effect carried on after its removal from the federal list. The refusal to register the party became a major public event in its own right: the Supreme Court ruling, the subsequent appeal and the party’s stated intention to keep challenging the decision were widely covered in the media. The hearings drew the party’s supporters. Public gatherings and rallies outside the Supreme Court building were accompanied by detentions, which made news in turn.

Alongside this ran a series of court disputes and removals of Yabloko candidates from regional elections. All of it kept the party in the public eye.

The content of that publicity matters just as much. Coverage of the campaign and of Yabloko’s removal kept restating the party’s radical distinguishing position — its demand for a ceasefire and an end to the war. The party gained not only additional name recognition but a unique political identity.

Confirmation that both the media effect and the campaign itself worked is that by September recognition of the party was all but universal: only 6.5% of respondents said they did not know of such a party.

How Yabloko supporters vote on the actual ballot

The second column is those who would vote Yabloko if it were on the ballot, answering about the actual ballot, from which Yabloko is absent. Shading marks significant differences from the sample as a whole.

	Total	Yabloko supporters
United Russia	23.9%	3.5%
Communist Party (KPRF)	16.0%	21.5%
New People	10.8%	18.4%
LDPR	7.3%	5.7%
A Just Russia	4.0%	5.2%
Party of Pensioners	1.9%	3.2%
The Greens	1.4%	6.0%
Rodina	0.9%	0.0%
Communists of Russia	0.5%	0.4%
Party of Direct Democracy	0.3%	1.5%
Anyone but United Russia	0.9%	3.9%
Would spoil the ballot	4.7%	4.1%
Would not vote	8.1%	7.7%
Hard to say / refused	19.3%	19.0%

significantly highersignificantly lowerp < 0.05

With Yabloko barred, its potential electorate (once the shares are recalculated on respondents who have decided on a party) redistributes above all towards the Communist Party (21.5%) and New People (18.4%).

Overall, barring Yabloko improves the standings of every permitted party.

With Yabloko on the ballot the share of decided voters rises from 67% to 73% of respondents: some of those who name no party today return to making a choice.

Party standings among decided voters: with and without Yabloko

The columns rest on different bases: putting Yabloko on the ballot brings back some of those who name no party today.

	With Yabloko	Without Yabloko
United Russia	31.8%	35.6%
Yabloko	24.6%	—
Communist Party (KPRF)	16.6%	23.9%
New People	10.3%	16.2%
LDPR	8.6%	11.0%
A Just Russia	4.1%	5.9%
Party of Pensioners	1.8%	2.8%
Rodina	1.2%	1.3%
The Greens	0.5%	2.2%
Communists of Russia	0.5%	0.7%
Party of Direct Democracy	0.0%	0.4%

Vote shares above the 5% threshold with Yabloko running

A Just Russia, at 4.1%, fails the threshold and drops out of the calculation.

	% of votes
United Russia	34.6%
Yabloko	26.8%
Communist Party (KPRF)	18.1%
New People	11.2%
LDPR	9.4%

In this configuration A Just Russia takes 4.1% and fails the threshold.

The election and the Duma

Expectations of a fair election: country and own region

Q20: “Do you think the election where you live will be conducted honestly, or will some candidates and parties be given extra votes?” Q21: “And across the country as a whole, do you think the election will be conducted honestly, or will some candidates and parties be given extra votes?”

The question was asked twice — about the election nationwide and about the election where the respondent lives.

	Nationwide	In own region
The election will be honest	30.8%	41.3%
Some candidates will be given extra votes, but it will not change the outcome much	23.5%	15.5%
The results will be substantially altered	32.7%	27.7%
Hard to say	12.9%	15.2%
Refused	0.1%	0.3%

Assessments diverge markedly depending on whether the question concerns the country or the respondent’s own area: 41.3% expect an honest vote where they live, against 30.8% nationwide.

Assessment of the laws passed by the 2021 Duma

Q10: “Since 2021 the State Duma has passed many new laws. On the whole, do you think these laws have brought the citizens of Russia more benefit or more harm?”

	% of respondents
More benefit than harm	19.9%
Benefit and harm in roughly equal measure	6.5%
More harm than benefit	40.2%
Had almost no effect on people's lives	1.7%
Bring neither benefit nor harm	4.3%
Do not know what laws the Duma passed	7.0%
Refused	0.3%
Hard to say	20.0%

The Duma's independence from the President

Q11: “Do you think the State Duma today has a real ability to disagree with the President’s view on important matters?”

	% of respondents
Yes, it can	23.3%
No, it cannot	49.0%
Hard to say	27.3%
Refused	0.4%

Methodology

The survey was conducted from 4 to 10 September 2026 among adult residents of Russia by telephone across all federal districts. The sample size at the time of publication is 800 respondents; the margin of error is ±3.5% at the 95% confidence level. The data are weighted by sex, age and federal subject. The survey was conducted by ExtremeScan on its own initiative.

The “decided” base comprises respondents who named a party in the voting question. The “decided with Yabloko” base comprises those who named a party or answered yes to the Yabloko question.

Fieldwork is continuing. The full report on a sample of 1,600+ respondents will be published after the election.